Evaluation of rankedballot voting methods
Note that, according to Gibbard and Satterthwaite, all of the systems I am considering here are sometimes vulnerable to voter
manipulation. Satisfying the criteria I find important tends to minimize chances for manipulation.
Summary of the methods' criterion compliances

Baldwin 
Borda 
Bucklin 
Carey 
Coombs 
Copeland 
Dodgson 
Hare 
Nanson 
Raynaud 
Schulze 
Simpson 
Tideman 
Paretooptimal? 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
majority? 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Condorcet? 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
mutual majority? 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
cloneindependent? 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
monotonic? 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
Smith? 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
YES 
YES 
YES 
NO 
YES 
reversesymmetric? 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
reinforcing? 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
Schwartz? 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
NO 
nonmanipulable? 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
NO 
# Coombs fails reinforcement 
# precinct 1 
8:B>C>A>D 
6:C>D>A>B 
4:D>B>C>A 
# precinct 2 
8:B>A>D>C 
2:B>C>D>A 
6:C>A>D>B 
2:C>B>D>A 
2:D>B>C>A 
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